Tranströmer’s Traces

2 am. Moonlight. Train stopped
in the middle of a field, cold city lights
flickering on the far brink of sight.

As if someone has sunk so deep into dream
she’ll never remember she was there
once she gets back to her room.

Or somewhere someone has slipped so deep
into sickness that his days all become a flickering
swarm of points scattered thin on the brink of sight.

The train stands utterly still.
2 am. Stark moonlight. Few stars.

***
From Tomas Tranströmer, Spår

På natten klockan två: månsken. Tåget har stannat
mitt ute på slätten. Långt borta ljuspunkter i en stad,
flimrande kallt vid synranden.

Som när en människa gått in i en dröm så djupt
att hon aldrig ska minnas att hon var där
när hon återvänder till sitt rum.

Och som när någon gått in i en sjukdom så djupt
att allt som var hans dagar blir några flimrande punkter,
en svärm, kall och ringa vid synranden.

Tåget står fullkomligt stilla,
Klockan två: starkt månsken, få stjärnor.

***
I don’t have much use for the Nobel Prize in Literature, so when Tomas Tranströmer won it a few years ago, I took no more than a cursory look at his poems. What brought me back was the Nordic noir TV series Wallander in its subtitled Swedish version.  The more I attended to the Swedish the more I was lulled by waves of cognitive dissonance, as if I were hearing English coming up out of what the Maya call a cenote, a well from which occult messages — well, they well up.

So I tracked down some  Swedish textbooks and ordered a bilingual Kindle edition of twentieth-century poetry, in which I found this poem, which was speaking to me as I decrypted it word by word. It felt as if I were plumbing depths. A key word in the poem is in fact djupt, deep.

Deftly, Tranströmer equates depth with distance, referring in the same breath to djupt and to synranden, the rim or orbit of sight, the horizon. We are lucky in English to have brink to join the two ideas. 

Others have translated spår as tracks, because of the train, or maybe the sense of horizonality we get from English spar. But spår can also mean trace, as in German Spur. And tracks can also be traces. 

I am sure that professional translators will find flaws in my version, which fell together in front of my eyes within an hour or two of work, work which felt like inspiration, and therefore was not work.

But remember:  as far as I am concerned, a poetic translation is a poem about another poem. Here, as whenever practical, I leave the original out of courtesy to the source poet, and as a trace of my own poem’s origins, tracks back to them.

In 1969, immigration to Sweden was one of the few options I had faced to avoid conscription into the US military. I chose otherwise. Maybe, just maybe, that was a mistake. 

Pascal’s Conditional, Subjunctive Wager

Since the age of sixteen, I have entertained discussions with a friend it would not be wrong to call a theologian. For most of our adult lives we were out of touch, though he was often in my thoughts the way everything and everyone have always been in our thoughts when we come to think of them again.

Last year, we renewed contact and naturally re-engaged with our debate.

One of his thrusts or parries led me to reflect on other stages of my life in which I had not only concourse but friendship even intercourse with religious persons, learning to speak the terminology of theology and doctrine with them in order to communicate.

His question turned around Pascal’s wager that each and every human bets that God exists or not. Given that such might be the case and taking into consideration the infinite gain or loss associated with belief, unbelief or disbelief in said God (an eternity in either heaven or hell), Pascal held that any rational person ought to live as if God exists and seek to believe in Him. If God did not actually exist, such a losing gambler would suffer not infinite but mere finite loss, measurable because imaginable, pleasures more likely than not sensual, and measured in the end against an infinity in hell.

Though admiring Pascal’s logic, which contributed to probability theory, I was never happy with his assumption that we could “pretend as if we believe” and God wouldn’t know or care about how false any virtue we thereby attained might be. This attitude betrays my Protestant orientation, since I presume that a relationship with a god or even God would be not only personal but sincere, without mediation.

The most telling description I ever heard of this “knowingness” of God was not from a Christian, rather a Muslim, the Imam of one of the first mosques in North America, Al Rashid, founded in Edmonton in the 1930s. In 1986, I ceremoniously converted to Islam in order to marry Nasrin legally in the eyes of the Iranian government — a legal procedure which facilitated her life and lent her a margin of safety in the early years of the Iranian Revolution, when she had to travel back for family reasons. The Sunni Lebanese Imam who married us and who filled out the documents she submitted to the Iranian Embassy in Ottawa was doubtlessly aware that my conversion was factitious. At one point in our discussions about Islam he assured me that it was not important to him if I were sincere in my conversion, since that was a matter between myself and Allah. Allah would know, when the time came to know, what I really thought.

The notion of a panoptic deity is a terrifying one, even more disturbing than that of a panoptic state, of which one extreme model is the eighteenth century prison which Jeremy Bentham imagined and about which Michel Foucault later wrote. Foucault was the consummate Parisian intellectual, hence bore within the crypto-Protestant strain of Catholic Jansenism, which remains strong among that national elite — one reason French Communism sank such deep roots. In his later thought, Foucault shifted towards a more orthodox perspective, arguing that confession to a human authority was the ultimate instrument of power and also of truth about one’s self, not observation of our acts. In other words, truth is institutional, not located in one’s own independent thoughts about oneself or about God.

This passing, peripheral reflexion on privacy and confession is, I would argue, relevent in this age of social media, selfies, and mass collection of that upstart deity, data.