Ran across this today, from Wolfram Eilengerger's Time of the Magicians:
"In 1923, things came to a head in Munich. Hitler, protected by a shock troop of his AS militia, following the glorious example of Mussolini in Italy, called on the crowd to “march on the capital" [edited]
— George Lang (@geogeoplots) February 15, 2021
The 29 December Financial Times published its annual round of predictions for the New Year and invited readers to chime in with their own. Here are mine. I have omitted a few of their questions as being of local interest (e.g. the future of Jacob Zuma as president of South Africa), as inherently unpredictable (the precise points of the growth rates, the US Fed fund rate and the S&P index a year from now), as well as banal CEO gossip (the fates of Blankenfein, Dimon and the like). I have added a few questions of my own, marked with an asterisk. See you in twelve months.
Will Article 50 be triggered in the first quarter of 2017?
Yes, unless it is delayed by either the Supreme Court or last minute political manoeuvers, which would buy time for compromises on all sides to seek softer conditions for Brexit. Once it is triggered, the grounds will definitely be set for a hard Brexit with consequences which are unpredictable but will likely bear no good for Britain or Europe, though beneficial to both the US and Russia if they can avoid coming to conflict over the morsels spread out between them.
Marine Le Pen win the French presidency?
No. Enough of the left-centre vote will shift to François Fillon’s “poujadiste” candidacy to defeat her in round two, compensating for the votes Le Pen will attract from the disaffected and unemployed working class. If she were to prevail, France would likely leave the Euro and seal a bargain with Russia and the US, creating a pseudo-Vichy state in the heart of a disintegrating Europe. Brexit would become even harder than before, as historical Anglo-French animosity rises again.
Angela Merkel win re-election in Germany?
Yes. She will have shifted enough to the right to forestall the AfD, but will still need to devise a motley parliamentary coalition, one including the SDP and the FDP, who will return to the Bundestag. Even supposing major terrorist attacks, the AfD will not gather enough support to rule without a coalition for which there would be no potential partners.
The Iran nuclear deal collapse?
No. Whatever Trump and the Republican hawks might like to believe, the JCPA is an international treaty with six signatories. The US can of course withdraw, but doing so would put it at odds with its potential partner Russia, whose interest is to maintain the nuclear club as is and who will, up to a point, continue to protect the Iranian position. With the exception of Germany, the continental Europeans will drift towards Russia, in the case of France no matter who wins the presidentials. In any event, the Iranians have cards of their own to play.
Trump and Putin do a Syria deal?
Yes, though this deal will be just one stage in the ongoing Great Game now turning around the Middle East. The Assad regime will be enscounced in a rump state while the interests of the Kurds will be sacrificed to those of other powers, which are all, let us note, non-Arab: Turkey, Iran, Russia and, yes, Israeli. This in no way means the end of slaughter and mayhem.
ISIS be destroyed as a significant global force?
No, if “global force” means to support and direct sporadic terrorism outside of the retrenched territory it will control even after the lost of Mosul and Raqqa. The division of labour in the alliance behind Assad (land forces and militia supported by Iran, air force courtesy of Russia) will be insufficient to root out ISIS, which will derive sustained legitimacy and hence attract adherents as the sole armed defender of Sunni ultra-orthodoxy. Expect Turkey, whose primary concern is the Kurdish threat to its unity, to be nominally involved but no more. Neither Russia nor rump Syria nor Turkey would want to see a strong US force with boots on the ground.
* There be progress on a two-state solution in Palestine?
No. A two-state solution is already beyond reach. Part of any Russian-US Syrian deal will be to confirm Israel as the sole governing power in “historical Zion”, an arrangement to which Russia can readily agree in exchange for its bolstered presence in historical Mesopotamia and on the Mediterranean. The presence of an nuclear-armed Jewish state sitting between Egypt and the Shia crescent running from Iran through Iraq and to the Bakaa Valley, conforms to Trump’s bruited model of allied nuclear-armed states. His “defense” of Israel will score him considerable domestic points.
* Cyberwar break out between the US and Russia?
No. Global cyberwar began full-time in the Naughts but is still at the stage of incremental experiment and deployment. We should not imagine a bi-polar conflict, since China will be seeking cyber advantages of its own. This is the future of warfare, since even physical combat is controlled by algorithm and AI.
* China accept containment?
No. Moreover, why should it? The Chinese will continue to create faits accomplis within the maritime zone defined by the Nine-Dash-Line and, albeit slowly, pursue their territorial ambitions to the West along the so-called New Silk Road. They will promote and stabilize the reminbi insofar as they can while they slowly begin to disengage from their US paper holdings, though these remain potential pressure points in retaliation against American provocations. The demise of the TPP was an unexpected windfall for Xi Jingping, making it even less likely than before that the rise of China can be stymied. All Asian states including those as far away as Afghanistan and Australia need to readjust their strategy in terms of China’s power. This process will continue in 2017.
North Korea successfully test a nuclear-capable missile?
No, though sooner or later they will, unless Kim Jong-un cuts a deal with the US. China would be ambiguous to say the least about the privileged rapprochement such a deal would imply, since, as the conflict between China and the US heats up, a nuclear North Korea could serve as a useful pawn the former can play against both South Korea and Japan. The latter have no choice but to shelter under the US umbrella, paying more for it.
Trump build the Mexican border wall?
Yes, if by “wall” we mean more partial barriers along the border, not necessarily a unbroken structure resembling the Great Wall of China. The growing damage to the Mexican economy and collaterally to US businesses sectors and consumers dependent on low cost immigrant labour will, on the other hand, exacerbate undocumented migration to the US. Mass deportations are not feasible but we should expect considerable bluster on this issue over the next year.
* Trump “tear up” NAFTA?
No, but it will be re-negociated, at least in part. In general, the demise of the TPP and the TTIP will seriously damage world trade, setting off a geopolitical recession and possibly a new age of protectionist merchantilism. With its large internal market, the US has perhaps less to lose than countries more dependent on exports. In the intermediate and long range though, the largest internal market in the world is China’s, India’s next. Trump’s economic chickens will not be coming home in 2017, though four years down the road the Federal government will fiscally devastated, as least the non-military sectors of it. This will fulfill the wish of the many on the right who want government out of their lives, including in health care, the environment and the regulation of the marketplace and banking for common social good.
* Registry of Muslims?
No. Expect, however, stricter, racially determined immigration rules and regulations, plus even more exacting and arbitrary US border point checks in which profiling will play an egregious role.
* Trump stuff the Supreme Court?
Yes. This is one issue Trump and recalcitrant Republicans can agree on. The Supreme Court will be reactionary for the whole next generation, ruling in favour of the privileges and the values of the shrinking white minority.
* Finally, is there anything good to look forward to in 2017?
The Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, crafted or had crafted a superb note of official congratulation to the newly-elected US President. Dripping with irony but absolutely correct in terms of expected language, formula and cliché, Kantian to boot.
“Germany and America are bound by their values: democracy, freedom, the respect for the law and the dignity of human beings, independent of their origin, skin color, religion, gender, sexual orientation or political position. On the basis of these values I offer the future president of the United States, Donald Trump, close cooperation.”
„Deutschland und Amerika sind durch Werte verbunden : Demokratie, Freiheit, Respekt vor dem Recht und der Würde des Menschen, unabhängig von Herkunft, Hautfarbe, Religion, Geschlecht, sexueller Orientierung oder politischer Einstellung. Auf der Basis dieser Werte biete ich dem künftigen Präsidenten der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, Donald Trump, eine enge Zusammenarbeit an.“
He and his vocabulary of charms haunt us, to the point that Dasein no longer needs the italics of a foreign word. The expurgation of Yiddish from German culture — admittedly a backhanded way to speak of the Holocaust — meant that a promising rival cognate of sorts was obliterated from wide currency. Doikayt could be translated as ‘here-and-now-ness” (Da-keit in German, as opposed to Da-sein, “being there”). It was a guiding principle of Bundism, the organized social democratic movement in eastern Europe whose focus was to seek alliances with other distinct and even sometimes hostile cultures, customs and religions in multicultural societies. After all, there is no escape possible from the principal contradiction, which is capitalism. So why go anywhere? Doikayt lost out to the escapist Zionist ideal of “somewhere-other-ness” (but a somewhere “we” once were). A relique of twentieth-century political nomencature, doikayt survived for only a few more decades, confined to the Yiddish-speaking diaspora, a seed without issue. As for Dasein, it has, alas, prospered, a fetish to wield within the English-speaking critical-theoretical academy, snaring us in convoluted tangles of speculative meaning from which there is no exit.
On the importance of Yiddish to high German literature, see Deutsch-Jüdischer Parnass: Literaturgeschichte eines Mythos, Willi Jasper. As for the relation German once had with the Yiddish language: Was ist Deutsch?, Utz Maas. Finally, for bios and close-ups of the literary figures in the Canadian diaspora who wrote in Yiddish and Hebrew, there is Cents ans de littérature yiddish et hébraïque au Canada, Heim-Lieb Fuks et Pierre Anctil. In the mid-twentieth century, small cells of Bundist affiliation influenced Canadian social democracy, in the big cities at least. The history of the Prairies was entirely different, but no less an extension of ideology forged in eastern Europe, not necessarily, it goes without saying, in the Pale.
— H. H. N.
Many, especially those in the pockets of the military industrial complex, think that at Munich in 1938 it should have been possible to foresee that allowing Germany to seize control of Czechoslovakia, even under a flmsy diplomatic veil, would have fearsome consequences.
A few days ago I re-posted on the July Agreement in which Germany and its Allies publicly inflicted abject status on Greece, this with we don’t know exactly which threats concerning the consequencces of a Grexit from the eurozone.
Was this, I asked, another Versailles, as the former Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis asserted? Or shouldn’t we better see this ukase in the light of the collaborationist Vichy government under Germany occupation, which the hobbled Greek one might then come to resemble?
Instead of Vichy, let me now paste in the trope of Munich.
Vichy works as a simile up to a point, but there is an functioning parliament in Greece, with representatives stretching from the openly fascist extreme right to what the bourgeois media call the extreme left, by which they mean those who speak openly of capitalism and class conflict. This was not the case in occupied France, where the only real opposition was underground and led by communists, who had, incidentally, stopped talking much about capitalism and class for the sake of national unity, résistance oblige.
History doesn’t repeat itself, but there are many analogies between what happened at Munich in 1938 and what Europe as a whole signed onto in July, 2015. Germany has not actually invaded Greece, but a crucial stage has now been passed in the developing crisis in which Europe finds itself. Instead of melting away, geopolitics is returning with a vengeance, dialectically one might say, right into heartland of those who were expressly trying to supercede it, wipe it by compromise away. Henceforth it will be hard to speak of Europe without speaking of its internal power relations, in particular of German hegemony.
The eventual consequences of the Summer of 2015 are still latent, or as the French say, larvées. Only time will tell if this moment will mark the beginning of the end of Thomas Mann’s European Germany, as a German Europe becomes the new order of things, and as neo- and crypto-fascist movements proliferate outside of Germany but increasingly within.